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abstract
In this paper, I argue that John Dewey's view of human nature entails that 
culture is a necessary but not sufficient condition for freedom. A surprising 
corollary of this argument is that, if left to run its natural course, culture 
in fact tends not to enable but rather to preclude freedom. Hence, there 
are specific cultural practices—habits acquired through education—that 
are required if we are to realize our freedom and thereby also fulfill our 
nature as human beings.
In his 1938 essay “Does Human Nature Change?” John Dewey advances the po-
sition that human nature both does and does not change.1 This initially perplex-
ing answer to the question that is the subject of his essay reflects a methodologi-
cal principle that Dewey employs in his argumentation throughout Experience 
and Education.2 According to the principle articulated in that book, when one is 
theorizing, one ought not to fall prey to the human tendency “to think in terms 
of extreme opposites.”3 Doing so can lead one to a mistaken understanding of the 
matter about which one is theorizing, which can in turn have pernicious practical 
consequences. Instead, when theorizing, one ought to depart from rigid “either-
or” thinking; that is, one ought to recognize other possibilities, intermediate op-
tions between two polar opposites, in terms of which to think. This methodologi-
cal principle informs Dewey’s thinking on many different issues. In the case of the 
question of whether human nature changes, the principle is manifested in Dewey’s 
resistance to the temptation to argue (at least in response to the theoretical side 
of the question) either that human nature changes or that human nature does not 
change. In this essay, I shall explain both the conception of human nature that 
enables Dewey to answer the question at hand as he does and the implications of 
Dewey’s answer for the closely related question of human freedom. As we shall 
see, 1) Dewey views human beings as creatures who are by nature inextricably 
bound up in culture, 2) this view entails that human beings are by nature free, 
but that freedom is not a given quality or feature of human life, and 3) this state 
of affairs in turn entails that education is crucial for the achievement of freedom 
and thereby also for human fulfilment.
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human naturE and human culturE
In “Does Human Nature Change?” Dewey is able to advance the position that 
human nature both does and does not change because he distinguishes between 
an aspect of human nature that changes and one that does not. On the one hand, 
human nature does not change because it consists of a number of “unchangeable 
elements.”4 These elements, “innate needs” that human beings have “for food and 
drink and for moving about, for example, are so much a part of our being that 
we cannot imagine any condition under which they would cease to be.”5 Among 
these unchangeable elements, which issue from “the fact that human nature has its 
own constitution,”6 are also needs that are “not so directly physical,” such as “the 
need for some kind of companionship; the need for exhibiting energy, for bringing 
one’s powers to bear upon surrounding conditions; . . . the need for some sort of 
aesthetic expression and satisfaction; . . . etc.”7 These “not so physical” needs con-
stitute “tendencies so integral a part of human nature that the latter would not be 
human nature if they changed.”8
On the other hand, human nature changes because its unchanging elements 
find expression in that “complex body of customs” known as “culture.”9 As Dewey 
puts the point, “[t]he need for food is so imperative that we call the persons insane 
who persistently refuse to take nourishment. But what kinds of food are wanted 
and used are a matter of acquired habit influenced by both physical environment 
and social custom.”10 Since there have been and are many different human cultures, 
each with “its own pattern, its own characteristic arrangement of its constituent 
energies,”11 there have been and are many different ways in which basic human 
needs have manifested themselves.12 Thus, as Dewey argues, we err when, having 
“recognized that there is something unchangeable in the structure of human na-
ture[,] . . . we suppose that the manifestations we have got used to are as natural and 
as unalterable as are the needs from which they spring.”13 In other words, although 
we might rightly insist that human nature is to some degree fixed, we would go 
astray in our thinking about the question of the changeability of human nature if 
we were to overlook or ignore the development of and transformations within and 
across human cultures.
Dewey’s claim that human nature consists of a number of unchanging ele-
ments that find a variety of cultural expressions marks an important development 
in his thinking about human nature. Eight years before publishing “Does Human 
Nature Change?” Dewey argues in an essay entitled “Human Nature” that one 
cannot “make any hard and fast distinction between the natural and the acquired, 
the native and the cultural.”14 Although in “Human Nature” he recognizes the 
practical utility of making such a distinction,15 he also argues that this distinction 
“cannot be justified by appeal to the facts.”16 Towards the end of “Human Nature” 
Dewey gestures in the direction of his later thinking about human nature when 
he claims that “[i]t cannot be doubted that there are some limits to modifiability of 
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human nature and to institutional change, but these limits have to be arrived at by 
experimental observation.”17 Presumably, the limits to the modifiability of human 
nature that he has in mind here are those at which he hints when, in the context of 
a discussion of the contributions that developments in psychology have made and 
will make to thinking about the question of the constitution of human nature,18 he 
says that “the native equipment is, roughly speaking, identical with the biological 
equipment.”19 By the time he wrote “Does Human Nature Change?” Dewey had 
reached the point of naming some of the specific, unchangeable elements of human 
nature that limit the extent of its modifiability.
The development in Dewey’s thinking about human nature between the pub-
lication of “Human Nature” in 1932 and “Does Human Nature Change?” in 1938 
is important because the distinction Dewey draws in the latter essay between the 
aspect of human nature that does not change and the aspect that does is significant 
for several reasons. In the first place, the distinction allows Dewey to avoid giving an 
either-or answer to the question of whether human nature changes, which enables 
him to respect his own methodological principle. Moreover, because he is able to 
resist the temptation of either-or thinking about the matter of the changeability of 
human nature, he likewise avoids the unhappy practical consequences for social 
change that follow when one treats the question of whether human nature changes 
as an either-or question.20 Furthermore, Dewey’s distinction between changeable 
and unchangeable aspects of human nature is significant because, if he is correct, 
it means that human beings are by nature inextricably bound up in culture.
Dewey expresses the substance of his view that human beings are by nature 
inextricably bound up in culture at the end of the first chapter of Freedom and Cul-
ture, where he says that there are “reciprocal connections [between] raw human 
nature and culture.”21 He elaborates on this view of human nature by saying that 
“biological heredity and native individual differences . . . operate within a given 
social form, they are shaped and take effect within that particular form.”22 Dewey’s 
view that human beings are inextricably bound up in culture is plausible because 
it accords well with what we know about the human situation. We human beings 
are entirely helpless at birth and thus dependent for our survival upon the care 
provided by others. While we are in the care of others—our family members and 
our teachers, for example—we become familiar with the social practices of those 
others and come to adopt many of them ourselves. Indeed, as Simone de Beauvoir 
points out in the second chapter of The Ethics of Ambiguity, we are so thoroughly 
embedded in the social practices of others that, as children, we see human culture 
as given to us in the same way that the natural world is given to us.23 As we mature, 
we may come to recognize the artificiality24 of human culture and undertake to 
change that culture, but it is only ever on the basis of a nexus of already acquired 
social practices that we are able to criticize and change particular social practices 
within that nexus. Michael Eldridge makes a similar point in the introduction to 
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Transforming Experience: John Dewey’s Cultural Instrumentalism when he says that 
with culture we find ourselves in “the sort of environment that we cannot tran-
scend. We may be able to modify or even escape a particular culture, but we are 
in an important sense culturally bound.”25 Thus, even while we are breaking away 
from culture in some ways, we are at the same time embracing it in other ways.26
human frEEdom
Dewey’s view that human nature changes because unchanging basic human needs 
find their expression and satisfaction in and through human culture is significant 
because it entails that human beings are by nature free, but that freedom is not 
simply a given quality or feature of human life. It is an acquired condition of living. 
Human beings are by nature free because, if there is an aspect of human nature that 
changes, then—provided the change in question is of the appropriate sort—freedom 
is a permanent possibility for human beings. That is, if human beings can change 
aspects of their own nature themselves, then freedom is a permanent possibility for 
human beings. Without this kind of changeability, human beings would have no 
choice but to live out the lives that their biological and psychological natures had 
determined they would live.27 Any changes that might occur in the nature of hu-
man beings who lacked the power to change themselves would be wrought by the 
impersonal forces of nature rather than by the deliberate activity of human beings 
themselves. Dewey puts the point rather emphatically when he says that “the theory 
that human nature is unchangeable is thus the most depressing and pessimistic of all 
possible doctrines. If it were carried out logically, it would mean a doctrine of pre-
destination from birth that would outdo the most rigid of theological doctrines.”28 
Let us bracket for the moment the question of whether human beings can and do 
change aspects of their own nature themselves because the following discussion 
will give us reason to answer this question in the affirmative.
Although Dewey’s view that human nature changes because unchanging 
basic human needs find their expression and satisfaction in and through human 
culture entails that human beings are by nature free, that freedom is not simply 
a given quality or feature of human life, but an acquired condition of living. As 
Dewey says in his 1928 essay “Philosophies of Freedom,” “like all other possibili-
ties, this possibility [of freedom] has to be actualized; and, like all others, it can 
only be actualized through interaction with objective conditions.”29 Despite being 
a permanent possibility for human beings (the argument for this possibility will be 
resumed below), freedom is not simply a given quality or feature of human life. This 
is because human culture has a twofold character whereby, paradoxically, the very 
culture that enables and supports human freedom also disables and undermines 
human freedom.30 On the one hand, as we have seen (and shall see), there is some-
thing about culture that allows it to support the possibility of freedom for human 
beings. On the other hand, however, there is something about culture that compels 
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human beings to act in specific ways. Dewey articulates this twofold character of 
culture when, in “Does Human Nature Change?”, he says that
The revolutionary radical . . . overlooks the force of engrained habits. He is 
right, in my opinion, about the indefinite plasticity of human nature. But 
he is wrong in thinking that patterns of desire, belief, and purpose do not 
have a force comparable to the momentum of physical objects once they 
are set in motion, and comparable to the inertia, the resistance to move-
ment, possessed by these same objects when they are at rest. Habit, not 
original human nature, keeps things moving most of the time, about as 
they have moved in the past.31
As this quotation suggests, culture does not merely compel human beings to act in 
specific ways; rather, it compels them to act in the same specific ways. Specifically, 
human culture tends to compel human beings to continue acting as they have acted 
in the past because the habits that make up human culture are often extremely re-
sistant to change.32 As Dewey says in Freedom and Culture,
Culture as a complex body of customs tends to maintain itself. It can re-
produce itself only through effecting certain differential changes in the 
original or native constitutions of its members. . . . By the mere force of its 
existence as well as by deliberately adopted methods systematically pur-
sued, it perpetuates itself through transformation of the raw or original 
human nature of those born immature.33
In other words, it is the natural character of culture to tend toward fixity rather than 
changeability, that is, toward what is in effect determinism rather than freedom.34
Because human culture tends toward fixity rather than changeability, free-
dom, if it is indeed a possibility for human beings, will not be something that is 
simply a given quality or feature of human life. Instead, it will have to be an ac-
quired condition of living. It is worth emphasizing at this point that, although hu-
man culture determines human beings’ activities in various ways, the view of the 
relationship between human nature and human culture that Dewey advocates does 
not imply cultural determinism. On the contrary, Dewey’s view that human be-
ings change because their unchanging basic needs find their expression in human 
culture is compatible with human beings’ ability to change themselves because, as 
Dewey sees it, “human nature is the factor which in one way or another is always 
interacting with environing conditions in production of culture.”35 In other words, 
according to Dewey, human culture does not stand over against human nature be-
cause human culture in fact issues from human nature, that is, because it is in our 
nature to express and fulfil ourselves through culture. Through the development 
of economic, legal, and industrial institutions,36 for example, human beings chan-
nel their energies into practices that enable them to satisfy the basic physical and 
“not-so-directly-physical”37 needs that their human nature has imposed upon them. 
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These practices are not fixed, however, as is obvious not only from the fact that dif-
ferent economic, legal, and industrial institutions exist in different cultures, but 
also from the fact that such institutions change over time within a single culture. 
Thus, although particular human needs may be determined in advance by forces 
beyond the control of any human being, the means by which and the manner in 
which those particular needs are fulfilled are not likewise so determined. Dewey 
describes the dynamic character that human nature possesses by virtue of its inter-
action with social institutions when he says that “the changes in human relations 
that are brought about by changes in industrial and legal institutions then react 
to modify the ways in which human nature manifests itself, and this brings about 
still further changes in institutions, and so on indefinitely.”38 Without this kind of 
constantly evolving culture and its contribution to the slow process of civilization, 
which is “itself . . . the product of altered human nature,”39 human beings would live 
lives that were entirely determined by factors over which they had no control. Thus, 
as Dewey says in “Philosophies of Freedom,” “the possibility of freedom is deeply 
grounded in our very beings. It is one with our individuality, our being uniquely 
what we are and not imitators and parasites of others.”40 As Dewey shows us, we 
owe this deeply grounded possibility of freedom to the existence of human culture.
Having examined the aspect of human culture that prevents human freedom 
from being a given quality or feature of human life, we are now in a position to see 
the plausibility of the view that human beings can and do in fact change themselves. 
To begin with, it is obvious that culture changes—in the past, for example, women 
were not permitted to vote, but now they are; in the past, African-Americans were 
not permitted to mix with Anglo-Americans, but now they are; in the past, homo-
sexual couples were not permitted to marry, but now they are. But if culture tends 
toward fixity because it tends to perpetuate itself “[b]y the mere force of its existence 
as well as by deliberately adopted methods systematically pursued,”41 then cultural 
change is unlikely to happen on its own. So it is plausible that cultural change hap-
pens not because culture changes itself, but because human beings make cultural 
changes—women are permitted to vote because people like Susan B. Anthony fought 
for such a change; African-Americans are permitted to mix with Anglo-Americans 
because people like Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King Jr. fought for such a change; 
homosexual couples are permitted to marry because people like Kevin Bourassa, 
Joe Varnell, and Dan Savage have been fighting for such a change. Although such 
changes are local and imperfect—they have yet to spread to places where individu-
als are struggling to achieve these very same cultural changes—the fact remains 
that these cultural changes have been effected by individual human beings work-
ing together toward the common aim of making such changes.
We have now seen how Dewey’s view that unchanging basic human needs 
find their expression and fulfilment in and through changing human culture entails 
that human beings are by nature free. However that freedom is not simply a given 
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quality or feature of human life, but an acquired condition of living. As a result of 
culture’s twofold character—a character that leads it simultaneously to enable and 
to resist change—the existence of culture not only makes freedom a permanent 
possibility for human beings, its existence also makes it extremely difficult for hu-
man beings to achieve and maintain freedom. Dewey underscores how difficult it 
is for human beings to achieve freedom when, in Freedom and Culture, he articu-
lates his view of freedom as follows:
The view that love of freedom is so inherent in . . . [human beings] that, 
if it only has a chance given it by abolition of oppressions exercised by 
church and state, it will produce and maintain free institutions is no longer 
adequate. . . . We are now forced to see that positive conditions, forming 
the prevailing state of culture, are required. Release from oppression and 
repressions which previously existed marked a necessary transition, but 
transitions are but bridges to something different.42
What Dewey says here is noteworthy because it casts doubt on the view that freedom 
is an instinct or drive that compels human beings to act in ways that satisfy that 
instinct or drive.43 While it may be that the innate need “for moving about”44 that 
Dewey gives as an example of an unchangeable element of human nature requires 
a particular kind of freedom in order to be satisfied, it is not this kind of freedom 
that Dewey is talking about in this passage. Instead, freedom is here presented as 
something that must be actively sought within culture.
In light of Dewey’s conception of freedom as something that must be actively 
sought within culture, that is, as something that must be developed and main-
tained,45 it is clear that Dewey endorses a positive conception of freedom. Dewey 
articulates his positive conception of freedom clearly in Experience and Education 
when he says that
The commonest mistake made about freedom is, I think, to identify it with 
freedom of movement, or with the external or physical side of activity. Now, 
this external and physical side of activity cannot be separated from the 
internal side of activity; from freedom of thought, desire, and purpose.46
As Dewey here indicates, for him, there are two aspects to freedom. One aspect, 
associated with the “external and physical side of activity,” corresponds roughly 
to what is often called negative freedom, namely, freedom from restriction.47 The 
other aspect, associated with the “internal side of activity,” corresponds roughly 
to what is often called positive freedom, namely, the kind of freedom that enables 
individuals “to secure full realization of their potentialities.”48 Dewey describes 
the relationship between these two aspects of freedom when he says, again in Ex-
perience and Education, that “freedom from restriction, the negative side, is to be 
prized only as a means to a freedom which is power: power to frame purposes, to 
judge wisely, to evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from acting 
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upon them; power to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation.”49 
Here, Dewey’s restriction of the value of negative freedom to its instrumental value 
for achieving positive freedom indicates not only that Dewey recognizes a distinc-
tion between positive and negative freedom, but also that he endorses positive free-
dom. That is, on Dewey’s view, negative freedom is extremely valuable, but only 
because it is required if human beings are to be able to develop their potential, for 
while negative freedom removes certain barriers that would prevent individuals 
from developing their potential, unlike positive freedom, it provides them neither 
with the skills or abilities nor with the tools that they would need in order to in 
fact realize their potential.50
human fulfilmEnt
Dewey’s endorsement of a positive conception of freedom is significant because it 
implies that, for Dewey, education is crucial for human fulfilment. Based on the 
discussion up to this point, we may say that human fulfilment is to be understood 
as the satisfaction of unchanging basic human needs in ways that not only permit 
but also enable human beings to develop and express their individuality. As has 
already been suggested, the achievement of human fulfilment requires not merely 
negative freedom, but also positive freedom. That is, freedom from interference by 
the government, by one’s friends and neighbours, etc., is not sufficient for human 
fulfilment; in order for human beings to develop and express their individuality, 
they need the support of social institutions that can provide them both with the 
skills or abilities and with the tools that they need in order to be able to fashion 
their own lives for themselves.
Positive freedom in turn requires education. In the first place, Dewey’s re-
mark about how culture perpetuates itself by way of “deliberately adopted meth-
ods systematically pursued”51 implies that culture reproduces and maintains itself 
through (formal) education. Explicit confirmation that this is Dewey’s view about 
the relationship between education and culture is found in his essay “Does Human 
Nature Change?”, where he writes that “the very meaning of education is modifica-
tion of native human nature in formation of those new ways of thinking, of feeling, 
of desiring, and of believing that are foreign to raw human nature.”52 Since, as was 
argued above, culture is a crucial factor in human freedom, education is therefore 
also a crucial factor in human freedom. Moreover, the kind of positive freedom that 
leads to human fulfilment requires not merely any kind of education, but rather 
a specific kind of education. For while basic unchanging human needs must be 
fulfilled through the social institutions that make up human culture, one cannot 
conclude from the necessity of human culture for human fulfilment that the par-
ticular quality of the social institutions that make up human culture is irrelevant 
with respect to the fulfilment of human nature. Dewey suggests as much when he 
says that “[t]he existence of almost every conceivable kind of social institution at 
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some time and place in the history of the world is evidence of the plasticity of hu-
man nature. This fact does not prove that all these different social systems are of 
equal value, materially, morally, and culturally.”53 Thus, human fulfilment requires 
not just any kind of education that would suffice for human beings to create and 
participate in social institutions in general. Rather, it requires the kind of education 
that would permit human beings to develop and participate in social institutions 
that are as “materially, morally, and culturally” valuable as possible.
One way to measure the value of different social systems, perhaps the ulti-
mate way to measure the value of such systems, is in terms of the extent to which 
they contribute to human fulfilment. It was argued above that while the fact of 
human culture means that human beings are by nature free, that very same fact 
means that freedom is not a given. In light of this argument, it can be seen that a 
social system that provided few opportunities for human beings to develop their 
potential would be of less value than a social system that provided more opportu-
nities for human beings to develop their potential because the latter system would 
be more conducive to human fulfilment. Cast in terms of the distinction between 
negative and positive freedom, this means that a social system that provided for 
the freedom of individuals in the negative sense only would be of less value than a 
social system that provided not only for the freedom of individuals in the negative 
sense, but also for the freedom of individuals in the positive sense.
Education
In this paper I have argued that Dewey’s view of human nature entails that cul-
ture is a necessary but not sufficient condition for freedom. A surprising corollary 
of this argument is that, if left to run its natural course, culture in fact tends not 
to enable but rather to preclude freedom, which is itself a necessary condition for 
human fulfilment. Hence, there are specific cultural practices, acquired through 
a specific kind of education, that are required if we are to realize our freedom and 
thereby fulfil our nature. Of course much work remains to be done on questions 
about the nature of these practices if we are to say more than just that they “will 
produce and maintain free institutions”54 and that they will have to be acquired 
through education that is practiced as transformation rather than as conformity.55 
Fortunately, Dewey’s philosophy of education can serve as a rich resource to help 
us along in this work.
Turning to Dewey’s philosophy of education, we can take away at least three 
important lessons to help us with the intelligent, systematic reconstruction of con-
temporary educational practices.56 The first important lesson is in part a reiteration 
of what has already been said, namely, that if we do not practice the right kind of 
education, we shall never realize the human freedom that is always potentially ours. 
The kind of education in question has as its overarching aim the achievement of 
positive freedom, which is conceived of as requiring not only freedom from various 
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restrictions on human activity, but also positive conditions that enable the open 
growth that will make it possible for us to realize the potentialities of our individual 
natures. Such an education results in human fulfilment in a way that education 
that is geared towards achieving any other end cannot.
The second important lesson that can help us with the intelligent, systematic 
reconstruction of contemporary educational practices is that the kind of education 
that is required if we are to be able to achieve positive freedom crucially involves the 
development of habits of open growth, where a habit is conceived not in the narrow 
sense of being a “more or less fixed way of doing things,”57 but rather in a broader 
sense that “covers [both] the formation of attitudes . . . that are emotional and in-
tellectual . . . [, and] our basic sensitivities and ways of meeting and responding to 
all the conditions which we meet in living.”58 The development of habits of open 
growth constitutes an essential part of the kind of education in question because 
such habits “effect an adjustment of an individual and his environment.”59 The 
development of such habits requires, in turn, the development of specific kinds of 
habits of mind, where mind is conceived of as a power or capacity that is partially 
constituted by physical and social environments rather than as the possession of 
an isolated ego. Only such habits provide the flexibility of action that permits and 
enables us to make intelligent adjustments to our ever-changing situations.
The third important lesson that can help us with the intelligent, systematic 
reconstruction of contemporary educational practices is that at least three spe-
cific, related kinds of habits of mind are required if we are to be able to develop the 
flexibility of action that will enable us to grow toward the achievement of positive 
freedom and our fulfilment as human beings. Such development requires, in the 
first place, habits of self-knowledge, where self-knowledge is conceived primarily 
as the implicit understanding we have of ourselves regarding our status and value 
as persons. The fundamental concern here is not what collection of facts one knows 
about oneself, but rather what sense one has of being real, whole, and intimately 
connected to, yet independent of, other persons who are equally real and whole.60 
In the second place, the development of the flexibility of action that will enable us 
to grow toward the achievement of positive freedom and our fulfilment as human 
beings requires habits of self-control, where self-control is conceived of as the activ-
ity of a self that is at once both that which controls and that which is controlled.61 
In the third place, the development of the flexibility of action that will enable us 
to grow toward the achievement of positive freedom and our fulfilment as human 
beings requires habits of meaningful self-expression, where self-expression is con-
ceived of as the activity of a self that both unintentionally discloses and also inten-
tionally conveys what it is—its thoughts, feelings, desires, attitudes, purposes, and 
so on—to itself and others through its overt linguistic and non-linguistic actions 
(which include those actions that involve stillness and/or silence).62 Although the 
development of these three specific kinds of habits is not sufficient for human ful-
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filment because it is impossible to account for the contingent objective conditions 
that one encounters over the course of living, the development of such habits is 
necessary for human fulfilment because, without such habits, we cannot partake 
in the kind of adaptive change that constitutes an effective response to our ever-
changing physical and social environments.63
With these three important lessons about the kind of education that is re-
quired if we are to be able to grow towards the achievement of positive freedom 
and our fulfilment as human beings in mind, we can undertake the task of further 
inquiry. In particular, we can ask specifically about the kind of concrete practices 
that would enable us to develop the kind of Deweyan habits of self-knowledge, self-
control, and meaningful self-expression that would permit and enable us to realize 
the freedom that is always potentially ours. Although it is beyond the scope of the 
present essay to work out concrete answers to these questions, it seems likely that 
Dewey’s claims in Democracy and Education that “all communication (and hence all 
genuine social life) is educative”64 and that “[a]ll communication is like art”65 would 
serve as a fruitful point of departure for such an inquiry. From there Dewey’s Art 
as Experience66 would serve as a rich resource for working out the educative value 
of aesthetic experience. The results of such an inquiry could then serve as the ba-
sis for constructing and carrying out educational experiments that would inform 
our concrete practices. If we were to use “intelligent foresight and planning” rather 
than “routine and tradition”67 to guide our educational experiments, then we might 
reasonably hope to develop educational practices that would promote the habits of 
open growth that would make it possible for us to realize the potentialities of our 
individual natures and thereby fulfil ourselves as human beings.
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notEs
1. LW 13, 286–293. All references to John Dewey’s works are to The Collected Works of 
John Dewey, 1882–1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston and published by the Southern Illinois 
University Press in Carbondale and Edwardsville (1969–1991). All such citations take the 
form of two capitalized letters indicating that the reference is to either The Early Works, 
1882–1898 (“EW”), The Middle Works, 1899–1924 (“MW”), or The Later Works, 1925–1953 
(“LW”), followed by two sets of arabic numerals separated by a comma. The first set of nu-
merals indicates the specific volume in which the cited work appears, and the second set 
indicates the specific page number or page range where the citation occurs.
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Dewey’s final answer to the question of whether human nature changes is more compli-
cated than this because his ultimate conclusion is that, “so far as the question is a practical 
one instead of an academic one, . . . the proper answer is that human nature does change” 
(LW 13, 286). However, for current purposes this complication may be ignored. Compare 
Dewey’s discussion in Freedom and Culture of the “alleged unchangeableness of human na-
ture” (LW 13, 142). At least some of what Dewey says in the essay “Does Human Nature 
Change?” appears also in Human Nature and Conduct. In addition to having a chapter entitled 
“Changing Human Nature” (Chapter 9), for example, Human Nature and Conduct contains 
a discussion (MW 14, 79–82) of William James’ essay “The Moral Equivalent of War,” which 
Dewey mentions in passing (LW 13, 290) in “Does Human Nature Change?” Dewey also dis-
cusses the modifiability of human nature in his 1932 essay “Human Nature” (LW 6, 29–39).







9. Ibid., 76. In Experience and Nature, Dewey considers Edward B. Tylor’s definition of 
culture and offers a brief commentary on it: “According to Tylor, culture is ‘that complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, custom, and any other capabilities ac-
quired by a man as a member of society.’ It is, in some sense, a whole, but it is a complex, a 
diversified whole. It is differentiated into religion, magic, law, fine and useful art, science, 
philosophy, language, domestic and political relations, etc.” (LW 1, 42).
10. Ibid., 287.
11. Ibid., 77.
12. Ibid., 287. Compare Herbert Marcuse’s (1964) discussion in One-Dimensional Man: 
Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society of the historical character of human needs 
(as well as his subsequent discussion of “true and false needs”): “The intensity, the satisfac-
tion and even the character of human needs, beyond the biological level, have always been 
preconditioned. Whether or not the possibility of doing or leaving, enjoying or destroying, 
possessing or rejecting something is seized as a need depends on whether or not it can be 
seen as desirable and necessary for the prevailing societal institutions and interests. In this 
sense, human needs are historical needs and, to the extent to which the society demands the 
repressive development of the individual, his needs themselves and their claim for satisfac-
tion are subject to overriding critical standards” (4).
13. Ibid., 287.




18. In the passage in question, Dewey also discusses the contributions that the develop-
ment of anthropology has made to thinking about the constitution of human nature (LW 
6, 37).
19. Ibid., 37.
20. Dewey discusses the matter of social change throughout the essay “Does Human 
Nature Change?”
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21. LW 13, 79. Compare Dewey’s distinction between “raw human nature and culture” 
to William James’ (1899, 1962) distinction between “native reactions” and “acquired reac-
tions” in Chapter VI of Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals.
22. Ibid., 77.
23. Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: 
Citadel Press/Kensington Publishing Corp, 1976), 35–37.
24. The term artificiality is used here in the sense of artifact rather than in the sense of 
falsity. Compare Aristotle’s discussion in Physics of the claim that “[o]f things that exist, some 
exist by nature, some from other causes” (Bk. II, Ch. 1).
25. Michael Eldridge, Transforming Experience: John Dewey’s Cultural Instrumentalism 
(Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1998), 12.
26. Perhaps this is not true in situations of total anarchy, but it will be sufficient for pres-
ent purposes if it is at least true of normal human situations.
27. LW 13, 292. Compare the line of argument that the American lawyer Clarence Darrow 
develops in “Crime and Criminals: An Address Delivered to Prisoners in the Cook County 
Jail, Chicago, Illinois (1902),” which begins with a paragraph in which Darrow states, “I do 
not believe there is any sort of distinction between the real moral condition of the people in 
and out of jail. One is just as good as the other. The people here [in jail] can no more help 
being here than the people outside can avoid being outside. I do not believe that people are 
in jail because they deserve to be. They are in jail simply because they cannot avoid it on 
account of circumstances which are entirely beyond their control and for which they are in 
no way responsible” (6).
28. Ibid.
29. LW 3, 113–114. Compare Frederick Beiser’s (2005) claim in Schiller as Philosopher: 
A Re-Examination that “in the first Kritik [Immanuel Kant] had demonstrated only the 
possibility of freedom; but in the second Kritik he would proceed to a proof of the reality of 
freedom” (43).
30. Compare Sigmund Freud’s discussion in Chapters IV–V of Civilization and Its Dis-
contents of the severe and damaging restrictions that civilization places on human sexuality 
and human aggression. Compare also Freud’s claim in Chapter VII of the same work that 
“[r]enunciation of the drives no longer has a fully liberating effect” (64).
31. LW 13, 291–292. Another description of this particular twofold character occurs, along 
with a description of some other respects in which culture has a twofold character, in a quotation, 
from Alexander Goldenweiser’s article “History, Psychology and Culture: A Set of Categories 
for an Introduction to Social Science,” that Dewey provides in Experience and Nature: “‘Cul-
tural reality is never wholly deterministic nor yet wholly accidental, never wholly psychological 
nor yet wholly objective, never wholly of yesterday nor yet wholly of today, but combines all of 
these in its existential reality. . . . A reconstructive synthesis re-establishes the synthetic unity 
necessarily lost in the process of analytic dismemberment’” (LW 1, 42). Compare the idea of 
“analytic dismemberment” in this quotation of Goldenweiser with the following description 
offered by Friedrich Schiller in the first of his Aesthetic Letters: “Like the analytical chemist, the 
philosopher can only discover how things are combined by analysing them, only lay bare the 
workings of spontaneous Nature by subjecting them to the torment of his own techniques. In 
order to lay hold of the fleeting phenomenon, he must first bind it in the fetters of rule, tear its 
fair body to pieces by reducing it to concepts, and preserve its living spirit in a sorry skeleton 
of words. Is it any wonder that natural feeling cannot find itself again in such an image, or that 
in the account of the analytical thinker truth should appear as paradox?” (I.4)
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32. See also William James’ discussion of “the laws of habits” in Chapter VIII of Talks 
to Teachers.
33. LW 13, 76–77.
34. Terrance MacMullan recently raised the concern that it might be out of place to bring 
up the traditional opposition of freedom and determinism in a Deweyan context such as the 
present one because Dewey does not conceive of freedom in the traditional (liberal) sense. 
Although I acknowledge the legitimacy of the grounds for this concern, I believe that in the 
present context the question of the possibility of freedom is both a legitimate and a fruitful 
one to ask insofar as one can view the present attempt to answer it as part of an ongoing, 
Deweyan effort to reconstruct the traditional (liberal) notion of freedom.
35. LW 13, 75.
36. Ibid., 291. Dewey briefly articulates his conception of the nature of institutions in, 
for example, “The Fruits of Nationalism,” where he says that “to say . . . [that religion] is in-
stitutionalized is to say that it involves a tough body of customs, ingrained habits of action, 
organized and authorized standards and methods of procedure. The habits which form in-
stitutions are so basal that for the most part they lie far below conscious recognition. But 
they are always ready to shape conduct.” (LW 3, 153). For a discussion of the meaning of the 
term institution, see, for example, pp. 87–90 of Peter L. Berger’s (1963) Invitation to Sociol-
ogy: A Humanistic Perspective. There Berger writes that an “institution is commonly defined 
as a distinctive complex of social actions. Thus we can speak of the law, of class, marriage 
or organized religion as constituting institutions” (87). He then goes on to explain a view 
that “conceives of an institution as a regulatory agency, channelling human actions in much 
the same way as instincts channel animal behavior” (87). The connection between this view 
and Dewey’s own becomes especially apparent when Berger summarizes this view by saying 
that, “in other words, institutions provide procedures through which human conduct is pat-
terned, compelled to go, in grooves deemed desirable by society. And this trick is performed 
by making these grooves appear to the individual as the only possible ones” (87). Although 
it is questionable to what degree Dewey would agree with what Berger seems to imply is a 
sinister intention on the part of the institutors of the institutions, this last quotation accords 
well with Dewey’s view of the conservative nature of culture, of that part of culture that leads 
people to view human nature as unchangeable.
37. LW 13, 286.
38. Ibid., 291.
39. Ibid.
40. LW 3, 113.
41. LW 13, 77.
42. Ibid., 68.
43. Contrast Friedrich Schiller’s notion of a “play-drive” as articulated in his Aesthetic 
Letters. (Schiller introduces the term play-drive [Spieltrieb] in Letter XIV.3.)
44. LW 13, 286.
45. Compare Paulo Freire’s discussion in Pedagogy of the Oppressed of how freedom is 
not a gift (66), and of the many other factors that impede an individual’s becoming free (for 
example, fear of freedom, which Freire discusses on pp. 46–48). Such thoughts about freedom 
are pertinent to the situation of the protesters in Toronto, Ontario, who one day in 2009 lined 
both sides of Dundas Street between Yonge Street and University Avenue, and who, with 
placards in hand, shouted over and over again, “We want freedom!” and “We want justice!”
46. LW 13, 39.
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47. Compare the distinction between negative and positive freedom as this is discussed 
by Isaiah Berlin in his essay “Two Concepts of Liberty.”
48. LW 11, 38.
49. LW 13, 41.
50. Dewey discusses the limitations of negative freedom at length in Liberalism and 
Social Action (LW 11, 1–65), particularly in the second chapter, “The Crisis in Liberalism.”
51. LW 13, 77.
52. LW 13, 292. See Dewey’s essay “Human Nature” (LW 6, 29–39) for a discussion of 
the issue of the native and the acquired in human nature (see especially pp. 32 and 37) and 
for his remark connecting the issue of the modifiability of human nature to “the use of edu-
cational means that are regulated by intelligent foresight and planning instead of by routine 
and tradition” (LW 6, 38–39).
53. LW 13, 292.
54. Ibid., 68.
55. MW 9, 64. In Democracy and Education, Dewey criticizes the view of education that 
follows from G. W. F. Hegel’s view of institutions by saying that on such a view “conformity, 
not transformation, is the essence of education” (MW 9, 64). Compare Immanuel Kant’s claim 
in On Education that “children ought to be educated, not for the present, but for a possibly 
improved condition of . . . [human beings] in the future” (I.15). Compare Dewey’s claim 
in “Human Nature” that “[a]lthough schools abound, education as a controlled process of 
modification of disposition is hardly even in its infancy” (LW 6, 38).
56. These three lessons are drawn from my “Habits of Freedom: John Dewey and the 
Art of Education.”
57. LW 13, 18.
58. Ibid., 18–19.
59. MW 9, 51.
60. In The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness, R. D. Laing (1960, 
1990) provides an analysis of “ontological insecurity” that offers insight into the differing 
extents to which individuals have senses of themselves as being real, whole, and intimately 
connected to, yet independent of, other persons who are equally real and whole. In my (2011) 
“Deweyan Self-Knowledge and Genuine Education,” I argue that Laing’s analysis of ontologi-
cal insecurity is helpful for fleshing out the Deweyan distinction between the acquisition of 
self-knowledge and the development of self-knowledge.
61. After a two-chapter discussion of “the old question of individual freedom and social 
control” (LW 13, 31), Dewey begins Chapter 6 of Experience and Education by saying that 
“[i]t is, then, a sound instinct which identifies freedom with power to frame purposes and 
to execute or carry into effect purposes so framed. Such freedom is in turn identical with 
self-control; for the formation of purposes and the organization of means to execute them 
are the work of intelligence. Plato once defined a slave as the person who executes the pur-
poses of another, and, as has just been said, a person is also a slave who is enslaved to his 
own blind desires” (LW 13, 43).
62. Consider the importance that the notion of communication plays in Dewey’s phi-
losophy. For example, Dewey begins Chapter 5 of Experience and Nature with the statement 
that “[o]f all affairs, communication is the most wonderful” (LW 1, 132). Similarly, in Chap-
ter 3 of Experience and Education, he writes that “all human experience is ultimately social: 
. . . it involves contact and communication” (LW 13, 21). Again, communication comes up 
in “Philosophies of Freedom” in a passage in which Dewey says that “[e]xpression of ideas 
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in communication is one of the indispensible conditions of the awakening of thought not 
only in others, but in ourselves. . . . The open air of public discussion and communication 
is an indispensable condition of the birth of ideas and knowledge and of other growth into 
health and vigor” (LW 3, 113). In this passage, Dewey’s reference to “growth” makes it clear 
that, for Dewey, communication is of great educational import.
63. See Chapter 2 of Dewey’s Experience and Nature (LW 1) for a discussion of “Existence 
as Precarious and as Stable” and Chapter 1 of Dewey’s The Quest for Certainty (LW 4) for a 
discussion of “Escape from Peril.”
64. MW 9, 8.
65. Ibid., 9.
66. LW 10.
67. LW 6, 38–39.
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